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rFrom moral welfarism to technical non-welfarism. 




A focus on the information used in Bentham’s felicific calculus 
sheds new light on the contemporary debate in normative 
economics opposing non-welfarism to welfarism. As a 
utilitarian, Bentham is de facto welfarist on a moral sense. 
Unexpectedly, this study shows Bentham resorts to non-
welfarist information in his calculus. Thus, technical non-
welfarism is coherent with moral welfarism, and even, the 
former proves necessary not to betray utilitarian principles. 
To sustain this claim, we challenge a view opposing a “cardinal” 
to an “ordinal” calculus: these two calculi constitute different 
stages of a unique calculus; because of operational constraints, 
Bentham is bound to rely on proxies, hence on non-utility 
information.  
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1. Introduction. Bentham and welfarism 
Bentham’s utility principle is probably Bentham’s best-known doctrine (see 
Harrison 1983: viii). Studies may concern two aspects of the utility principle. Firstly, 
the possibility and the modalities of aggregation of individual interests into a 
collective interest have been widely discussed (see Shackleton 1972; Goldworth 
1979; about utilitarianism in general, see Sen and Williams 1982; Elster and Roemer 
1991). Secondly, the kind of information referred in the utility principle or used in the 
utility calculus (see Griffin 1986: chap.1; Sumner 1996: chap.4; about utilitarianism in 
general, see Sen 1979b; Hammond 1982) may refer to a very contemporary and 
lively debate in normative economics opposing welfarism to non-welfarism. This 
paper focuses on this second aspect for it allows to shed light on important issues 
such as analyzing the tools used in welfare economics. 
In order to analyze the normative content of welfare economics tools, one must 
study which welfare economic tool maps to which conception of justice. If the 
analysis of formal tools were sufficient, normative economics would yet provide the 
means to achieve this objective. Welfarism is the view according to which social 
welfare exclusively rests on individual utility: utilitarianism, among others, is a famous 
welfarist conception. Therefore, a social welfare function is welfarist if its domain 
confines to individual utility functions (a technical condition), which induces a welfarist 
conception of justice (a philosophical interpretation)
1.
But this view, belonging to social choice theory, may hardly be exported to 
welfare economics as such, without further consideration. As a matter of fact, as put 
forward by Fleurbaey (1998), Mongin and d’Aspremont (1998), philosophical A step back to Bentham 
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welfarism should be distinguished from technical welfarism. Philosophical (or moral) 
welfarism refers to a moral wise condition: the only relevant information in social 
ethics is individual utilities. Technical welfarism refers to the way of representing 
social welfare rather than to a moral interpretation for the social objective: a welfarist 
social welfare function is a function of individual utility functions only, as far as the 
former respects a Pareto indifference condition
2. In technical non-welfarism, social 
welfare evaluation does not depend only on individual utility functions, it may 
depends on different sources of information such as parameters or circumstances 
describing the position of the person or the group of alike persons. Technical non-
welfarism does not imply that individual utility in itself is not the ethical relevant 
information; it just determines a way to evaluate individual state that may diverge 
from the strict individual utility. 
If philosophical welfarism and technical welfarism were to merge, the use of 
technical welfarism would reveal the retained conception of justice is moral wise 
welfarist. The use of certain framework, as welfarism in welfare economics, would 
determine the normative conception put forward through the evaluations. According 
to this assumption, the interpretation of welfare economics assertions would be 
straightforward: they are moral wise welfarist. Furthermore, moral conceptions could 
only be diversified at the cost of altering the welfarist framework. The objective of 
diversifying views – as well as methods to express them – is the central aim of post-
welfarist literature, also called non-welfarist literature (see, among others, Sen 1970; 
1979; 1985; 1991; Pattanaik 1994; Sugden 1993; de Vroey 1990; Pattanaik, Salles 
and Suzumura 2004). Non-welfarism is the view according to which the evaluation of 
a social state does not depend only on individual utilities, but on other relevant 
information as well: the social objective depends on utility and on handicaps and A step back to Bentham 
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talents, rights, specific information about the environment, specific information about 
the person such as age, sex, race, occupation and so on.  
Assuming identity between technical and philosophical welfarism seems 
nevertheless unsafe. Individual utility function may represent any index for individual 
states, and not only for subjective individual utility, relevant for philosophical 
welfarism (see Kelsey 1987; Mongin and d’Aspremont 1998). On the contrary, if 
technical welfarism and philosophical welfarism were to remain distinct, the task of 
interpreting welfare economics tools would need more than some opposition between 
welfarism and non-welfarism, and the interpretation of the way to aggregate 
individual utilities. It becomes necessary to understand which elements, besides 
formal representation, are relevant to analyze the normative content of the tools. Not 
only a quest for sense, this study is also a quest for methods: it aims at pointing out 
the ways to analyze the existing welfare economics tools and contributes to elaborate 
new ones. Thus, the evaluations of real social states and public policies design are 
eventually at stake in this paper.  
In this perspective, the study of the links between philosophical and technical 
welfarism is a preliminary and necessary stage. To show this distinction holds, it is 
interesting to, firstly and specifically, study the coherence between philosophical 
welfarism and technical non-welfarism.  
Two distinct methods are available to undertake a discussion about such issues. 
The first method, namely analytic philosophy consists of formal reasoning, based on 
piecemeal appeal to intuition or on the tests of completeness or correctness. An 
example of this would be Rechenauer’s work (Rechenauer 2003): with formal proofs, 
he established that, even when non welfarist information is taken into account in 
social welfare evaluation, the framework may remain welfarist in the technical sense. A step back to Bentham 
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Another illustration of this may be found in Baujard (2005) concluding, on some 
specific example of public economics, that philosophical welfarism may be harmed 
by the appeal to technical welfarism. In the second method, namely, history of 
thought, one takes master piece of philosophical or economic literature, studies it 
carefully in order to develop new ideas or make specific demonstrations intended to 
be relevant to nowadays issues (see Lapidus 1996). This article resorts to the latter 
method. 
 
In order to argue for the existence and the relevance of a distinction between 
philosophical and technical welfarism, I suggest to show, for a given conception of 
justice, how consistent philosophical welfarism and technical non-welfarism may be. 
The conception I retained for this study is Jeremy Bentham’s utilitarianism, focusing, 
in particular, on Bentham’s utility calculus. He is the father of utilitarianism and his 
works embodies the springs of the forthcoming welfare economics at stake. 
Moreover, the design of the tools used for welfare policies and the links between the 
tool and the ethical conception are explicit in his works. After Bentham, and 
specifically since Marshall, in spite of some interesting exceptions, the belonging to a 
philosophical school will be less salient, less explicit, and almost shameful in 
economic literature. 
Utility does take the central place in Bentham’s doctrine: 
“Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign 
masters, pains and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we 
ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand 
the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and 
effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all A step back to Bentham 
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we say, in all we think: every effort we can make to throw off our 
subjection, will serve but to demonstrate and confirm it. In words a man 
may pretend to abjure their empire: but in reality he will remain subject 
to it all the while. The principle of utility recognizes this subjection, and 
assumes it for the foundation of that system, the object of which is to 
rear the fabric of felicity by the hands or reason and of law. 
But enough of metaphor and declamation: it is not by such means that 
moral science is to be improved.” (Bentham 1789: 1–2) 
The “principle of utility”, also called the “greatest happiness principle” or “the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number” (Bentham 1831-43: 211; 1789: 5; see 
Shackleton 1972; Dinwiddy 1989: 25–6), is the fundamental utilitarian principle: it 
defines the social objective, inducing the principle of action for judges, legislators, 
governors, and the private moral agent (educated by the deontologist). The interest 
of the community is nothing but “the sum of the interests of the several members who 
compose it”, which directly leads Bentham to try to understand “what is the interest of 
the individual” (Bentham 1789: 3). According to Bentham, the social objective, 
namely the utilitarian ethical principle, is reach the greatest happiness, therefore to 
serve individual interests or individual utilities. This allows to consider his doctrine as 
a philosophical welfarism. 
Bentham also makes a positive analysis of utility. Utility is the “property in any 
objects” or actions to “produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness” 
rather than pains. As a principle of the ”greatest happiness of the individual” (see 
Harrison 1983: 106-33), utility is the principle of action of each individual. 
The combination of the normative approach with the positive approach of utility, 
if they were inducing the same utility, would yield to a logical contradiction. There is A step back to Bentham 
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indeed no reason why the “ought” and the “is” should coincide: individual actions do 
not always contribute to collective interest. Individuals do not compute correctly their 
utility: they are not able to make the right computation of pleasures and pain. 
Besides, they might neglect the “fecundity” and “purity” of their act for instance, or in 
other words, “externalities” (see Sigot 1993: 29; Sigot 2001: 151; Lapidus and Sigot 
2001: 67; Sigot 2002: 5, 12) may not always be taken into account when individuals 
make their decision. As a consequence, an utilitarian society needs instruments in 
order to lead individuals to achieve by their own actions the greatest happiness in the 
community. Bentham suggests two solutions: the role of a deontologist (see Bentham 
1831; on the subject, see, for instance, Causin 1987) and the design of a law system. 
Implementing the right system of rewards and punishments is likely to guide 
individual actions, moved by their own interests, in the direction of the greatest 
happiness. In order to design this ideal law system, individual motives in actual 
situation should clearly be assessed (see Bentham 1872, part I: 195-220). This 
assessment is achieved through utility calculus, the actual method of deliberation. 
The presentation of the calculus, covered by three successive chapters in An 
introduction to the principles of moral and legislation (see Bentham 1789: chap. 4–6, 
27–69), is outstandingly subtle and precise. The latter will then be considered as the 
basic material of technical welfarism. 
This article thus focuses on the link between the principle of utility and utility 
calculus in Bentham’s works: the latter is the counterpart of individual utility functions 
in welfare economics, referring to technical welfarism; the former is the counterpart of 
the ethical objective welfare economics should aim at, referring to philosophical 
welfarism. In other words, history of thought is here used to analyze contemporary A step back to Bentham 
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issues: studying utility in Bentham’s works allows to understand the consistency 
between technical non-welfarism and philosophical welfarism.  
 
A lecture of the utility calculus that has been recently defended, henceforth 
called “the strong duality thesis”, is here altered. The alteration is twofold. Firstly 
(section 2), while the gap at stake in the duality lecture decides between an “ordinal” 
and a “cardinal” calculus, I claim nothing in Bentham’s works makes explicit this 
distinction; some clues rather supports a continuity thesis of Bentham’s utility 
calculus. This lecture argues for the consistency between technical welfarism and 
philosophical welfarism within the context of an ideal calculus and defines precisely 
what Bentham means by individual utility. Secondly (section 3), after displaying this 
utility calculus, Bentham puts forward how necessary it is to find alternative methods 
of measuring utility. Thus, the gap at stake in my view rather decides between what I 
will call an “ideal calculus” and a “proxy calculus”. Relevant information for the proxy 
calculus diverges from utilities as such. This lecture argues for the consistency 
between technical non-welfarism and philosophical welfarism within the context of 
the proxy calculus. 
Eventually, this new lecture of Bentham’s utility calculus allows to focus on 
relevant conditions allowing for interpreting technical welfarism or non-welfarism: 
when considering operational constraints, philosophical welfarism is best served by 
non-technical welfarism. 
2. An ideal measure for utility: The ideal calculus 
This section displays the argument for the first alteration of the duality thesis: 
there is no gap between ordinal and cardinal calculus. Basically, the different texts A step back to Bentham 
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devoted to the calculus do not stand for different alternative calculi, but rather stand 
for the different stages of a unique calculus.  
2.1. Duality vs. continuity of the utility calculus 
2.1.1.  The duality thesis 
The duality thesis was first developed by E. Halévy (1901, 1905) and was 
defended, notably, by A. Cot (1992) and N. Sigot (2001), though the term ‘duality 
thesis’ used to qualify it is ours. According to the duality thesis, Bentham displays, 
successively, two kinds of utility calculi: one resorts to “the science of classification” 
and has been called the “ordinal calculus”; the other one resorts to the “the science 
of calculus” and has been called the “cardinal calculus”
3 (Halévy 1901: 43). 
In the so-called cardinal procedure, utility’s value is assessed according to 
different criteria or circumstances: intensity, duration, certainty or uncertainty, 
propinquity or remoteness (Bentham 1789: 29), as well as fecundity, purity and 
extent (Bentham 1789: 30). Utility calculus is then obtained by a genuine “moral 
arithmetic” (Halévy 1901: 41). For this reason, Bentham could be viewed, among 
others, as “the Newton for moral and economics”. The so-called ordinal procedure 
lists categories of simple pains or pleasures (Bentham 1789: 33 and following). 
Circumstances influencing sensibility of heterogeneous individuals are also taken into 
account. Halévy considers the latter enumeration as a “scientific nomenclature”
4. For 
this reason, Bentham could be viewed as “the Lavoisier”
5 or “the Lineus for moral and 
economics” (Mitchell 1918: 182). 
A weak version of the duality thesis, defending there exists two distinct calculi 
that might correspond to different stages, is unclearly claimed in Halévy and is, 
between others, implicit in Cot (1992). The strong duality thesis, which is at stake in A step back to Bentham 
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this paper, is defended by Sigot (2001: 14; 158) and is implicit in Lapidus and Sigot 
(2000). In the latter, different calculi are exclusive from one another. They adapt to 
the different pursued objectives. Sigot distinguishes between the two procedures in 
the following way. Ordinal calculus specifies the nature of pains and pleasures while 
cardinal calculus does not. In the former, the goods belong to individuals and they do 
subjectively feel their actual utility. In the latter, they do not have them but they form 
objective expectations of the utility they could derive from it. Duality is due to the fact 
that each calculus meets different objectives. Cardinal calculus is considered by the 
legislator to design the most efficient laws. Ordinal calculus, supposed to be most 
subjective and made by individuals themselves, is used by the judge to enforce the 
law, for he needs to choose the right punishment for a specific person. For they are 
used by different persons, ordinal and cardinal calculi are two separate calculi. 
Meanwhile, both procedures, each of them focusing at different constraints over 
utility, each of them being used by different actors, are, together, necessary to 
achieve Bentham’s ideal: the design of a good law system. 
2.1.2.  Arguments for continuity 
Against the strong duality thesis, I here support the continuity thesis, which 
argues that these two calculi constitute two stages of a single calculus. This view 
already been defended, though in other terms and more briefly, by Baujard (2003) 
and by Guidi (2004, 2005). My lecture is based on three converging arguments: a 
historiographic argument, a logical argument, and a consistency argument. 
Utility calculus is displayed, in An Introduction of the Principles of Morals and 
Legislation
6, in several successive chapters: the combination of weighted criteria (the 
so-called cardinal calculus) in chapter four; the enumeration of subjective simple 
pains and pleasures (the so-called ordinal calculus) in chapter five and six. But the A step back to Bentham 
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presentation differs in E. Dumont’s French version of the Principles of Legislation
7:
the weighting process with dimensions is inserted in between the enumeration stage 
and the list of subjective circumstances. In other words, the two first chapters are 
inversed. In this version, ordinal calculus is pierced of cardinal traces, which yields to 
raise the idea according to which the distinction between ordinal and cardinal calculi 
is of little importance. If this is so, the strong duality thesis does not hold any more. 
As a matter of fact, cardinal calculus is composed of the accounting for each 
dimensions and the way to use them in a global calculus. If the two parts are not in, 
there is no cardinal calculus. As they are presented separately in the 1802 version, 
one may seriously doubt about the actual existence of a cardinal calculus as such. 
This argument is based on Dumont’s translation, but it cannot be hold that Dumont 
would have betrayed Bentham’s idea. As a matter of fact, Bentham did work very 
closely with the Genevan translator: the former read French perfectly and was 
corresponding regularly with the latter. Some correspondences even show that 
Bentham was reading Dumont’s version
8 and was satisfied of his work
9. Bentham 
could not have been unaware of this inversion. My guess is that we should not 
consider two distinct calculi (cardinal and ordinal) as far as Bentham interpreted 
these as step of one unique calculus.
10 
The second argument is based on the fact that certain components are together 
necessary for the construction of a measure. Any measure requires, on the one 
hand, the definition of what the basic element is and, on the other hand, a principle of 
separability of the elements, necessary for aggregation. Neither the ordinal calculus, 
nor the cardinal calculus provides these two constitutive parts of a measure. The 
ordinal calculus displays a list that allows to realize an elementary decomposition: in 
other words, it provides the definition of utility basic element (see Baumgardt 1952: A step back to Bentham 
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55). The cardinal calculus provides a weighting procedure out of the criteria and the 
individual circumstances: in other words, it provides the principle and the specific 
conditions to aggregate the basic elements of utility. Therefore, both stages are 
logically connected: we can conclude they are complementary rather than substitute, 
successive rather than alternative. 
A third argument bears out the continuity thesis as well, by pointing out 
Bentham’s coherent thought. I contend that, for Bentham, the utility principle is 
unique in spite of its different uses. When thinking of the specific work of the 
legislator, judge, governors or deontologist, one may be tempted to distinguish 
several interpretations of utility because the context of their use is different: it is a 
guide for individual behavior, it denotes the principle of justice and the principle of the 
collective good, it is the guide for legislators, judges and government decisions. 
These different uses and interpretations, for the very reason of their variety, could 
arguably yield to different calculi. Let’s consider for now the view that utility calculi 
should be different for each use of the principle. To put it another way, we would face 
different concepts of utility principle, each deserving specific names, at least for the 
sake of clarity. Consequently, there could be an actual distinction between this 
criteria of justice used by the legislator, that one by the judge and this other one by 
the government (or even the deontologist), as far as no specific attention is devoted 
to merge the interpretations of the different calculi. For instance, once the utilitarian 
system is set, utility as the criterion of justice would be on no account the rewarding 
principle of individual action. Now, the very acceptance of a plurality of utility 
principles amounts exactly to denying the basis of the benthamite utilitarianism. In 
order to avoid this disturbing implication of the manifold interpretations, Bentham’s 
utility should be able to resolve the ensuing tensions, and this delicate task is A step back to Bentham 
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achieved by the complexity of the utility calculus
11. Various calculations complement 
each other mutually and eventually merge into one. A complex utility emerges from it: 
it is, meanwhile, made objective as an observable physical state, and, if not 
subjective, at least idiosyncratic, in the sense that it incorporates the specific motives 
for individual actions. Out of the objective stage, utility becomes a piece of 
information appropriate for just public decisions and judgments. Out of the 
idiosyncratic stage, utility is also private information, as it stands for the actual 
motives for human behavior. It is because utility calculus takes into account 
simultaneously all these facets that law and the enforcement of appropriate 
punishments may have an effective and coherent impact on individual actions and 
will manage to achieve the utilitarian objectives, namely, the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number. 
2.2. Welfarist utility calculus 
2.2.1.  A three stages calculus 
Following these three arguments, the continuity assumption of utility calculus is 
henceforth considered to hold. Utility calculus can therefore be reconstructed as a 
three stages procedure, based on the process of identifying the cause for the 
existence and strength of utility. 
As any measure implies both the existence of a basic element and their 
aggregation, utility calculus entails, beforehand, a list of elements, and a way to 
decompose actual observable sensations into these elements. As the definition of the 
term “utility” rests on the definition of the terms “pleasure” on one hand and “pain” on 
the other hand (see Bentham 1789: 1-2; 24; 29), these elements will be elementary 
“pleasures” and “pains”. Bentham strives to isolate, among the pleasures and the A step back to Bentham 
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pains, the most important one in individuals’ eyes. This means that only some 
perceptions may be qualified as “pleasures or pain”. Besides, he asserts the relevant 
perceptions can be simple or complex. The perceptions are called simple if they 
“cannot be resolved into more”; they are called complex if they can be decomposed 
into several elementary pains and pleasures, therefore called “simple pains and 
pleasures” in his own words (Bentham 1789: 33). Without mentioning which method 
is used to draw up this list, which he just qualifies as a “heavy analytical work”, 
Bentham proposes a list he claims to be complete of the various simple pleasures 
and pains. He identifies fourteen simple pleasures and twelve simple pains
12. The 
pleasures include the pleasures of “sense”, of “wealth”, of “skill”, of “amity”, of “a 
good name”, of “power”, of “piety”, of “benevolence”, of “malevolence”, of “memory”, 
of “imagination”, of “expectation”, the pleasures “dependent on association” and the 
pleasures of “relief”. The pains include the pains of “privation”, of “the senses”, of 
“awkwardness”, of “enmity”, of “an ill name”, of “piety”, of ”benevolence”, of 
“malevolence”, of “the memory”, of “the imagination”, of “expectation” and the pains 
“dependent on association” (Bentham 1789: 33-4; see the details about each simple 
pains or pleasure in the following pages). As some pleasures are not associated to a 
corresponding pain, elementary pleasures are more numerous than elementary 
pains. 
Before aggregating pleasures and pains, Bentham introduces a second stage in 
utility calculus. Once each simple pleasure and pains is identified, they should be 
weighted by four criteria to obtain their relevant value: their “intensity”, their 
“duration”, their “certainty or uncertainty” and their “propinquity or remoteness”. Other 
criteria are also taken into account: “fecondity”, “purity” and “extent” (Bentham 1789: 
29-32). The levels of the criteria are specific to each individual and each situation
13.A step back to Bentham 
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For example, the intensity of pleasure derived from a thing for one person is not 
equal to the intensity of pleasure another person would derive from it.  
However, the legislator has no access to this private information needed to 
achieve the utility calculus. He rather needs information open to observation. An 
objective account for utility is then needed. If this rationale is put up to its extreme 
consequences, utility should be interpreted as an intrinsic property of the things to 
produce pleasure and pain (Mongin and d’Aspremont 1998: 280), independently of 
the effects of things on the pleasures or the pains individuals actually feel. And as a 
normative principle, justifying individual actions, this would not be shocking at all. 
Utility and its measure would be unique for everybody. With nowadays words, utility 
would be a function of things identical for all people, which means information about 
“things” becomes sufficient information for any public and judgment decision. This 
would undoubtedly facilitate any interpersonal comparisons of utility likely to be 
necessary in future stages. Considering a list of pains and pleasures derived from 
specific situations independently to individual characteristics means that the same 
offences require the same punishments, no matter what specific circumstances the 
individual who committed them actually was in. Nevertheless, pains and pleasures 
are only likely to motivate individuals to act the right way if the formers are 
individually incentive or dis-incentive. Utility is, as a matter of fact, the principle 
explaining action. What really matters to implement justice is then, rather than pains 
and pleasures as externally observed by outsiders, pains and pleasures individuals 
actually feel. Thus, it necessary to choose idiosyncratic penalties. Individuals 
estimate ex ante pains and pleasures generating an action. Their choice to act or not 
to act relies on these anticipations. If the system of penalties is well adapted, their 
calculation will drive them to act so that they actually contribute to the biggest A step back to Bentham 
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collective utility. Bentham hence proposes an intermediate way to objectivate utility. 
Utility should be observable, but it does not need to be unique for each person: the 
measure should be specific to each person. This explains the third stage of utility 
calculus: he introduces observable parameters describing individual circumstances 
influencing individual sensibility (see Bentham 1789: 43-69; for a more concise 
presentation, see Bentham 1802, I: 60-77). This approach requires to draw up an 
exhaustive list of the elementary circumstances affecting the sensibility of the 
individuals. Due to lack of courage, he says, Bentham does not undertake this heavy 
task. He rather proposes a "method" allowing to identify certain circumstances. 
Individuals’ sensibility is first based on their temperament or their “original 
constitution”. It is besides influenced by health, strength, hardiness, bodily 
imperfection, the quantity and quality of knowledge, strength of intellectual power, the 
firmness of mind, steadiness of mind, bent of inclination, moral sensibility, religious 
sensibility, religious biases, sympathetic biases, antipathetic sensibility, antipathetic 
biases, insanity, habitual occupation, pecuniary circumstances, connexions in the 
way of sympathy, connexions in the way of antipathy, radical frame of body, radical 
frame of mind. Bentham’s utility is thus idiosyncratic: it is not subjective but specific 
for every individual. Eventually, utility is objective and parametric: it may differ along 
with different groups of individuals, defined by their specific circumstances. 
2.2.2.  Technical welfarism at the service of philosophical welfarism 
Bentham’s utilitarianism is by definition a philosophical welfarism: morally 
speaking, individual utilities, as captured by the utility principle, are the only relevant 
information to assess social welfare. 
According to the continuity thesis of utility calculus, the complex utility calculus 
integrates successively the various constraints connected with normative A step back to Bentham 
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interpretations of the principle of utility. This does not mean information about 
environment and individual characteristics are not relevant to infer individual utility 
but that they are relevant because they contribute to and eventually define very 
sharply individual utility. 
Therefore, representation of the utility is welfarist, in the technical sense. 
Besides, it is coherent with philosophic welfarism.  
3. An operational measure for utility: The proxy calculus 
Unexpectedly, Bentham criticizes this very utility calculus. On the one side, 
information that proved indispensable to realize utility calculus is severely difficult to 
get and, even so, it might be unreliable. On the other side, the project is likely to 
become inconsistent because of the authoritarian aspects of utilitarianism. Bentham 
the suggest another method of deliberation, resorting to satisfactory proxies for utility. 
It leads to distinguish the “ideal utility calculus”, presented in the previous section, 
from the “operational utility calculus”, presented below.  
Two types of proxies for utility are eligible. Currency is the proxy favored by 
welfare economics succeeding Bentham. Besides, I shall attempt to argue for the 
role of a second proposition he made: the appeal to secondary circumstances, which 
typically coincides with non-welfarist information. I then observe how Bentham 
manages to remain simultaneously welfarist in the philosophical sense while he 
becomes non-welfarist in the technical sense.  A step back to Bentham 
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3.1. Necessary satisfying proxies 
3.1.1. Self-criticism 
First of all, because of problems of gathering information or the questions about 
the reliability of information, utility calculus displayed earlier is hardly operational. 
Bentham pains and pleasures calculus designed to implement the right laws and 
their mode of enforcement for various situations is certainly robust and exhaustive. 
Bentham recognizes however that it would prove difficult – and even vain – to 
actually try to put it into practice, although it was designed for this particular purpose. 
This difficulty comes in particular from the second and the third stage of the 
calculation, which require a very sharp specification of criteria and individual 
circumstances. Bentham points out more particularly the circumstances stage: 
“I do not want to hide specious objections. “ How is it possible to take 
into account all these circumstances influencing sensibility? (...)” A head 
of family can consider these internal dispositions, these varieties of 
characters for the treatment of his children; but a public schoolteacher, 
in charge of a limited number of followers cannot. All the more reason 
for the legislator who has in mind numerous people to be obliged to 
confine to general laws, and even, he must be afraid of complicating 
them by coming down to particular cases.” (Bentham 1802, I: 81, my 
translation; see also Baugmardt 1952: 235-236) 
Bentham notices that the identification of all the relevant circumstances, to 
estimate the causes for sensibility of every individual, all the more if we are interested 
in a whole community, is a long work. It is so inordinately tedious, expensive, and far 
from the competence and role of a judge or a parliament that the solution consisting A step back to Bentham 
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of giving up this method is very tempting, nay very hard to avoid. The second 
argument raised by Bentham concerns the difficulty to access to the private 
information relevant to assess individual utility. Indeed, the legislator faces a problem 
of asymmetric information between the State and the individuals. The latter would be 
well advised to manipulate information in their favor, especially poor men and civil 
servants
14. The possibility of manipulating information raises a severe doubt about 
the reliability of the information necessary to implement the law system. Thus, two 
types of arguments ought to be distinguished here: the possibility of access to the 
information – thus a condition of existence –, and the reliability of the information – 
thus a condition of quality. In other words, even if this information were available, it 
would still not be reliable. 
Secondly, Bentham accounts for the internal incoherence of the principle of 
utility. As far as each individual is the best judge of his own interests, interests of the 
community are better assessed by the largest number of people. Now, the former 
utility calculus incorporated in the law system is likely not to end to this desirable 
result. Bentham notably underlines the risk of judges’ arbitrary power (see Bentham 
1802, I: 81)
15. The design of the laws by legislators must be general and must 
neglect particular contingencies while law enforcement by the judges must be 
adapted to each particular situations (by considering the circumstances of the 
offence, the consequences of the offence on the victim and on all the members of the 
society...) Requiring that law enforcement respects these contingencies while law is 
general generates a gap. Because of the gap between the situations foreseen by the 
laws and the actual situations to be judged, the judges face a zone of uncertainty law 
does not control. This gap generates a possibility for an arbitrary power of the judge. 
This is unacceptable. Besides, the legislator should design laws in the collective A step back to Bentham 
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interest. But we can imagine without any trouble that he might pursue his own 
interest. He would choose a law system maximizing his own utility and abandon the 
right objective of maximizing collective utility. Rather that “the biggest utility of the 
biggest number”, we might get “the principle of the biggest utility of the legislator”. 
Hence, the judge, the legislator, or any person in charge of the utility calculus, may 
violate the supreme principle of utility. And again, this situation is not acceptable. 
Bentham, under the influence of James Mill
16, was then converted to democracy: a 
democratic construction of utility calculus constituted a possible and satisfactory 
answer to circumvent this violation of the utility principle.  
Another utility calculus is then necessary, that would be consistent with the utility 
principle in any situation. While technical welfarist utility calculus would seem to 
make sense at first sight, this calculus actually proves to be an ideal construction, 
unlikely to serve faithfully philosophical welfarism. Working out some alternative 
calculus is imperative to make benthamite utilitarianism operational. 
3.1.2.  The quest for a proxy 
Ideal utility calculus includes various successive stages, as presented earlier. 
Drawing up the list of all elementary pains and pleasures derived from each action 
and weighting them by seven criteria and taking into account the thirty-two 
circumstances influencing individual sensibility should be a tedious task. Bentham 
suggests substituting this calculus with some proxies. He notably suggests to resort 
to the measuring rod of money
17. Money indeed constitutes a proxy for utility 
displaying a number of advantages
18.A step back to Bentham 
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First of all, it requires very little information compared to the ideal calculus, for 
which necessary data are difficult to find, private and not always reliable. Monetary 
measures are, on the contrary, accessible information to the legislator.  
“Instead of pleasure itself, to show how an estimate might be formed of 
the diminution of propinquity and certainty, it becomes necessary to 
substitute to pleasure itself some external object known by experience 
to be of the number of its sources or say its causes: for example, 
money.” (Bentham 1822: 540-41) 
The second advantage of the measuring rod of money is that it provides a 
measure of intensity of pleasures  out of reasoning about indifference, along with 
nowadays microeconomics standards (see Bentham U.C. 27.36, reproduced by 
Goldworth 1979: 11). On the one hand, cardinal measure allows to realize 
calculations making sense for one individual. On the other hand, it allows to compare 
different individual utilities. In other words, the appeal to the measuring rod of money 
facilitates the realization of intrapersonal and interpersonal comparisons of utility, 
necessary to express social judgments. Bentham may thus consider the measuring 
rod of money as the basic information summarizing pains and pleasures data.  
“Now, money, as has been said is the only current and universal means 
in the hands of the Legislator of producing pleasure.” (Bentham U.C. 
27.36, reproduced by Goldworth 1979: 12) 
It may be used to infer the right policy or to implement policy. 
The advantages of the measuring rod of money must not mask its drawbacks. 
And Bentham was indeed aware of its limits. He particularly had in mind the problem 
of what is now called “decreasing marginal utility” (see Goldworth 1979: 3), and the 
variations of utility of money over time and over persons (see Bentham U.C. 27.35, A step back to Bentham 
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reproduced by Goldworth 1979: 7-8). To bypass this problem, Bentham considers it 
is unimportant when small quantities are at stake. This condition, resumed later by A. 
Marshall
19, may prove impossibly demanding: in these very situations, one should not 
resort to this measure. Besides those Bentham raised himself, several other 
problems could be raised as well. The measuring rod of money hardly takes into 
account fecondity and purity without any further inquiries (see Halévy 1901 : ?). From 
then on, the role of time and of external effects is not straightforwardly captured in 
monetary measures. It is problematic since Bentham did justify their importance and 
did make some effort to integrate them in utility calculus. The measuring rod of 
money seems at first sight convenient to respect the operational objective of utility 
calculus. But it fails to report every essential elements of utility principle without 
further specific work. Bentham concludes that the measuring rod of money is a very 
imperfect tool to assess utility, but that it might be necessary to make do with it, for 
“lack of better instrument”. To resume his metaphor, a bad thermometer is still better 
than no thermometer at all (see Bentham U.C. 27.37, reproduced by Goldworth 
1979: 13). 
3.2. A non-welfarist utility calculus 
3.2.1.  Objective and idiosyncratic utility 
The measuring rod of money may notably be blamed for not taking into account 
differences in individual sensibility, while they are relevant for the principle of utility. 
Because of these differences requiring specific weighting for each person according 
to her personal circumstances, utility calculus proved too complicated and too heavy 
to be considered as operational. Bentham then suggests another way around. Rather A step back to Bentham 
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than considering these numerous primary circumstances, secondary circumstances 
could be used instead as satisfactory proxies (see Bentham 1789: 65-6). 
In An introduction in the principles of the morality and the legislation, both types 
of circumstances are listed together: primary circumstances correspond to the first 
twenty-four circumstances and the secondary ones correspond to circumstances 25 
to 32. Besides, it is interesting to notice that, in Dumont’s presentation, each type of 
circumstances belongs to a distinct section (see Bentham 1802, I: 70). Bentham 
does specify their difference of status:  
The secondary influencing circumstances “have an influence, it is true, 
on the quantum or bias of a man’s sensibility, but it is only by means of 
the other primary ones. The manner in which these two sets of 
circumstances are concerned, is such that the primary ones do the 
business, while the secondary ones lie most open to observation. The 
secondary ones, therefore, are those which are most heard of; on which 
account it will be necessary to take notice of them: at the same time that 
it is only by means of the primary ones will be apparent enough, without 
any mention of the secondary ones.” (Bentham 1789: 58) 
The so-called “first circumstances” (basically consisting of strength, light, 
firmness of mind, perseverance, ideas of honor, feelings of sympathy) are not always 
observable or, at least, data about these circumstances are not always reliable. For 
this reason, they can hardly be used in utility calculus. Legislator’s account for utility 
may be based on “secondary” circumstances, such as sex, age, rank, education, 
habitual occupations
20, climate, lineage, government and religious profession. 
These secondary circumstances explain nothing independently of their link with 
the primary circumstances. In this sense, they are not part of an actual definition of A step back to Bentham 
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utility in itself; they are just interesting because of their correlation with relevant 
circumstances. Indeed, they are “any very visible things, very easy to observe, very 
convenient to explain the different phenomena of sensibility” (Bentham 1802, I: 70). 
They are observable and this observation provides reliable information. Thanks to 
their correlation with the primary circumstances, identifying secondary circumstances 
provides a satisfactory proxy for utility calculus. This modifies substantially the way to 
assess pains and pleasures by those who actually put into practice utility calculus, 
i.e. government, legislators and judges.  
“It is not a question of answering but of clearing up: because all this 
contain a difficulty rather than an objection; the principle itself is not 
denied, but its enforcement is considered as impossible. 1° I agree that 
most of these differences in sensibility are imperceptible, that it would be 
impossible to even notice its existence in individual dispositions, or to 
measure its strength or degree; but fortunately these internal and hidden 
bents have, so to speak, external and obvious indices. These are the 
circumstances, which I called secondary: sex, age, rank, education, 
habitual occupations, climate, lineage, government, religious profession; 
obvious and tangible circumstances representing internal dispositions. 
That’s a relief of the most difficult part for the legislator. He does not 
settle on metaphysical or moral qualities, he just considers conspicuous 
circumstances. He orders, for example, to modify such punishment, not 
because of the biggest sensibility of the individual, or because of his 
perseverance, strength of mind, lights, etc., but because of sex and age. 
It is true that the presumptions derived from these circumstances are 
likely to be in the wrong. A child of fifteen years old might be more A step back to Bentham 
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enlighten than a man of thirty; such a woman might have more courage 
or a lower sense of decency than such man. But these presumptions will 
have, generally, all the required correctness to avoid passing tyrannical 
laws, and especially to reconcile the legislator to the opinion votes. 2° 
These secondary circumstances are not only easy to grasp; they are in 
small number, they form general categories. They might generate 
justification, mitigation, or aggravation for various offences. So, the 
complication disappears, everything comes down easily to the principle 
of the simplicity. 3° There is no arbitrariness: it is not the judge but the 
law who modifies this or that punishment, according to sex, age, 
religious profession, and so on. […]” (Bentham 1802, I: 82-4)
21 
Reconstructing Bentham’s idea, I could claim that operational utility calculus is 
achieved in two steps. Firstly, pains and pleasures are assessed by the measuring 
rod of money, observing actions and situations. Secondly, this measure is adapted to 
the persons at stake – culprits, victims, and any stakeholders in the affair – by 
introducing the description of their secondary circumstances. First step gives general 
information about actions, second steps corrects this first result as drawbacks that 
may happen by not taking into account individual specification. Thus individual utility 
is assessed by incorporating two kinds of information that are not in itself utility but 
are actually considered as good proxies for utility. 
3.2.2.  Bentham is technically non-welfarist. So should be utilitarians! 
In utilitarianism, the social objective, namely utility principle, is based on 
individual utilities. Utilitarianism is welfarist in the philosophical sense. An intuitive 
tool to conduct utilitarian policy would be some measure of social welfare that would 
be welfarist in the technical sense. For Bentham, utility is to be measured by A step back to Bentham 
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assessing the cause for pains and pleasures. The three steps calculus defines what 
utility really is according to the utility principle. What I have dubbed “the ideal utility 
calculus” is the basic welfarist information in the technical sense for Bentham’s 
utilitarianism. 
Nevertheless, he suggests that legislators, judges and governors use a different 
source of information. So that the calculus be operational, it proves necessary not to 
settle to the inherent practical difficulties of utility calculus and go on. There exists 
proxies for this utility that are objective, interpersonally comparable and correspond 
to criteria recognized as relevant for justice issues: money and secondary 
circumstances. The appeal to proxies then allows to avoid most obstacles for 
implementing a utilitarian system of laws and utilitarian policies. But in using them, 
Bentham is notably moving away from technical welfarism. Some information proving 
relevant to assess social utility differ from individual utility while using utility 
information may yield to violate the very utility principle, mainly because of 
operational constraints on the process of gathering such information. In other words, 
he justifies the fact that a non-technical welfarism may be the most efficient way to 
serve philosophical welfarism. Non-technical welfarism is consistent with 
philosophical welfarism. Thus, unexpectedly, Bentham, the father of utilitarianism, is 
technically non-welfarist. Following Bentham, we now know there is no utilitarian – or 
welfarist – reasons to reject technically non-welfarist works. Even more, this is an 
important teaching for utilitarian: as L. Stephen would claim that “to accept the 
philosophy was to be also pledged to practical applications of Utilitarianism” (Stephen 
1900: chap. VI, section 1), one can be utilitarian if and only if he or she accepts and 
uses the actual way to enforce it, namely here, technical non-welfarism. A step back to Bentham 
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The distinction between philosophical and the technical version of welfarism is 
not yet standard in welfare economics. The confusion is on the contrary widely 
spread. Here, we clearly showed that there is no simple link between technical 
welfarism and philosophical welfarism: the intuitive connection does not hold. A 
general conclusion can be derived from this study. As the link between interpretation 
and formal representation is not straightforward, 1) when you intend to express some 
normative conception, picking the right tool is not obvious; 2) when you want to 
identify the social justice conception expressed by some specific tool, as social 
welfare functions in welfare economics, analyzing the formal representation for the 
latter proves to be insufficient, it is necessary to take into account the effects of 
operational constraints on interpretation, between which, notably, the procedure used 
to pick non-welfarist information. 
 
*I would like to thank C. Chauvet, M. Guidi, A. Lapidus and N. Sigot for their helpful comments. I 
remain of course responsible for all remaining shortcomings. This paper has been presented at the 
conference of the European Society for the History of Economic Thought in Stirling University, June 
2005. 
*Antoinette Baujard, CREM, University of Caen. E-mail: Antoinette.Baujard@unicaen.fr
1 Another step to analyze the normative content of the social welfare functions used in welfare 
economics concerns the aggregation of individual utilities into social welfare. This issue is probably the 
most studied in normative economics, as well as in Bentham’s studies, but this is not the issue we 
address here. 
2 According to Pareto indifference condition, if everybody’s utilities in the society is equal in two 
different situations, social welfare should also be equal for these two situations. This condition is the 
minimum requirement to express welfarism. See Holtug 2003. Note though that technical welfarism is A step back to Bentham 
p. 28 
 
often characterized with a further condition, called independence condition. See, for instance, 
d’Aspremont et Gevers 2002. 
3 This designation, which has nothing to deal with the standard opposition between cardinal and 
ordinal measures of utility, is commonly used in Bentham’s studies, in spite of a regrettable risk of 
confusion. 
4 “By setting the rules of his moral arithmetic, he works on constituting, in some ways, a mathematical 
arithmetic analogous to mathematical physics.” (Halévy 1901: 43 our translation). See also Halévy 
1901: 46. 
5 “By searching the principle of a natural classification of motives and offences, he proceeds like the 
doctor classifying diseases; or even, to stick to the same branch of sciences, he proceeds like the 
botanist, who classifies genera and species, as the chemist who wants to give the new science a 
tongue, he creates a scientific nomenclature.” (Halévy 1901: 43 our translation). See also Halévy 
1901: 46. 
6 Bentham 1789. References of other texts where Bentham displays the utility calculus are listed in 
Mitchell 1918: 164. 
7 Bentham (1802, I, II, III) is an interpretation of Bentham’s thought, based on many differents texts. 
For the list of these texts, see Bentham 1802, I: viij-ix. For a systematic study of the used sources, see 
Halévy 1901: 281-85. 
8 Letter from Dumont to Bentham: “Here is, my dear Bentham, the original and the copy – I didn’t have 
the time to re-read it, which could have spared you some corrections – I preferred for these of a 
certain extent, that you write them with a nib rather than with a pencil that awfully tires my eyes and 
sometimes definitely vanishes – and maybe it should be better to put them on aside-sheets with page 
reference.” (Lettre 1052, in The correspondences of J. Bentham, vol.5: 127, written in French, our 
translation). 
9 Letter from Bentham to Dumont : “Between us, I think we know something about legislation. I have 
often been enchanted – never shocked” (Lettre 1697, in The correspondences of J. Bentham, vol.7: 
28). See, also on the subject, Harrison 1983: xii-iv. 
10 The main arguments of Guidi to reject the strong duality thesis are indeed that there is no textual 
proofs for this. See Guidi 2004: 113. A step back to Bentham 
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11 Before insisting on the diversity of the components of utility, Bentham, speaking about the utility 
calculus, claims: “To give it the whole efficiency it should have, that is to say, to take it as a basis for a 
common reason, there are three conditions to fulfill. The first one is to link to this word utility some 
clear and specific notions that could exactly be the same for all who use them. The second one is to 
establish the unity, the sovereignty of this principle, excluding rigorously everything that is not it. […] 
The third one is to find some processes of a moral arithmetic, through which we could reach uniform 
results.” (Bentham 1802, I : 2) 
12 In E. Dumont’s Traité, fifteen pleasures and eleven simple pains are enumerated (Bentham 1830, I: 
38-49) while the 1789 edition of An Introduction, which is the standard reference, refers to fourteen 
and twelve pleasures and pains, respectively (Bentham 1789: 33-42). 
13 A presentation of the arithmetic rules needed to integrate these criteria in the actual utility calculus 
and some illustration of such a calculus are given in Bentham U.C. 27.5, edited by Baumgardt 1952, 
appendice IV. 
14 For a complete presentation of Bentham’s argument about these two examples, see Sigot 2001: 
174-79. 
15 Nonetheless, Bentham was aware of these foreseeable consequences of uncertain rules for civil 
servants so that he designed many rules to avoid them. On this subject, see Gérard 1987. 
16 According to a standard thesis, Jeremy Bentham's meeting with James Mill in 1808 would be the 
decisive event for his conversion to democracy. For others, the failure of the Panopticon project and 
the lack of confidence inspired by George the third, would have contributed to the estrangement of 
Bentham from the authoritarian aspects of utilitarianism, until he eventually joins democracy’s ideal. 
17 Notice the role of money in measuring utility fits very well in the context of the duality thesis as well. 
See, for instance, Sigot 2001: 153-5. 
18 Money does not take much place in Bentham (1789) but appears to be more and more important in 
later works, such as the Principles of the Civil Code (knowing that An Introduction was written in 
1780), the Codification Proposal, the Constitutional Code and the Pannomial fragments.
19 Marshall was also aware of the severe drawbacks of the measuring rod of money. See Marshall 
1890: 24. A step back to Bentham 
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20 Notice there has been a discussion between Dumont and Bentham on whether habitual occupations 
should be considered as primary or secondary circumstances. See Bentham 1843: 308-9. 
21 I choose to reproduce this text for it is more explicit than former ones to explain the status of 
secondary circumstances. This version is my translation from the French version by Dumont. Notice 
there exists an English translation of this text by Hildreth. 
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